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DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE IN TRANSITION 
Marion Smiley* 
DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE. By Ian Shapiro. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 1999. Pp. xiii, 333. $29.95. 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE. By Ruti G. Teitel. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 2000. Pp. ix, 292. $35. 
Ruti Teitel's1 Transitional Justice and Ian Shapiro's2 Democratic 
Justice come out of very different academic traditions. But they both 
develop a view of justice that might loosely be called pragmatic by vir­
tue of its treatment of justice as a value that is simultaneously 
grounded in practice and powerful in bringing about social and politi­
cal change. Moreover, they both use this shared pragmatic view of jus­
tice to provide us with two things that are of great importance to the 
study of transitional justice and democracy in general. The first is an 
explanatory framework for understanding how legal institutions and 
claims about justice function during periods of transition from authori­
tarianism to democracy. The second is a normative framework for 
generating principles of justice that can be used to democratize prac­
tices in all spheres of life: personal, social, economic, and political. 
Teitel and Shapiro's general view of justice is very compelling on 
its own terms and particularly well suited to the efforts of those who 
want to think about justice practically without degrading it or treating 
it as merely superstructural. The pragmatic view of justice they de­
velop does not, like its transcendental counterparts, force us to locate 
a universal moral principle called justice. Nor does it, like its more 
cynical realist counterparts, force us to accept the status quo or to re­
sign ourselves to a world where justice is considered to be no more 
than a mere mask for power politics and economic interest. Instead, it 
allows us to treat our moral and legal values, including justice, as both 
historically situated constructs and powerful tools for bringing about 
social and political change. 
While the pragmatic view of justice that Teitel and Shapiro de­
velop is potentially more realistic and more useful than its transcen­
dental and Marxist counterparts, it is not all that easy to substantiate 
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1332 
May 2001] Democratic Justice in Transition 1333 
in particular cases. Indeed, 1t is very difficult to substantiate in par­
ticular cases, since it requires us to view particular notions of justice as 
grounded in particular social and political practices and to show how 
these notions shape, maintain, and change the particular communities 
of which they are a part. Not surprisingly, very few of those legal and 
political theorists who now call themselves pragmatists actually get 
around to the required level of historical interpretation and empirical 
analysis, and those who do tend to focus on values that are obviously 
institutional in nature, such as property, rather than on those values 
such as justice that, while in dire need of contextualization, appear too 
far removed from practice to be grasped as anything other than uni­
versal truths.3 
Indeed, outside of John Rawls' recent avowal of pragmatism in his 
revised theory of justice,4 very few of those now writing on justice at­
tempt to understand justice as both grounded in, and powerful over, 
social and political practice. Instead, they generally fall back on either 
an idealist notion of justice, according to which justice is above, albeit 
applicable to, politics, or a realist notion of justice, according to which 
justice is so steeped in politics that it has. no power to shape, maintain 
or change social and political institutions. In other words, they gener­
ally fall back on the very realist/idealist divide that Dewey and other 
pragmatists spent so much effort on putting to rest. 
Both the realist and the idealist notions of justice have, admittedly, 
the advantages of simplicity in most of their many guises - advan­
tages that pragmatists can only envy from afar, since their own analy­
ses are necessarily messy. But neither of these two notions of justice is 
as attractive as its adherents suggest that it is. The realistic notion of 
justice - or at least that which treats justice as politics - appears to 
be empirically sound. But it is too flat in its determinism to grasp the 
various ways in which justice as an ideal exerts power over the social 
and political practices of which it is a part. Hence, while it manages to 
avoid the traps of idealism, it does not in the end live up to the very 
standards of realism that its advocates rightly place at the center of our 
attention. 
The idealist notion of justiCe is, in its most abstract formulation, 
coherent. But it cannot as so formulated help us to figure out what jus­
tice looks like in particular contexts. Nor can it show us how to bal­
ance justice claims with the practical constraints of institutional life. 
For, to do so, it would have to incorporate into itself both the details 
of particular spheres of life and the rules according to which particular 
social and political institutions are now governed. In other words, it 
would have to allow itself to be determined, if only in part, by the very 
3. See, e.g., MARGARET RADIN, REINTERP RETING PROPERTY (1993). 
4. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL L IBERALISM (1996). 
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contingencies of social and political practice that it is supposed to be 
free of as a transcendental value. 
Interestingly enough, those idealist notions of justice that now ap­
pear to have a great deal of substance do so because those who ar­
ticulate them assume as givens a variety of historically and culturally 
particular institutions and practices. Rawls himself acknowledges the 
dependence of his own principles of justice on the historically and cul­
turally particular practices of Western democracy: liberal individual­
ism, market economics and secularism. But he does not provide con­
crete connections between his two principles of justice, on the one 
hand, and these particular practices, on the other. Nor does he tell us 
how they operate together. Hence, in the end, he confronts the same 
dilemmas of application that other idealists face in their efforts to de­
velop normative theories of justice that are practical. 
All of this suggests that both the purely idealistic and the purely 
realist notions of justice have serious drawbacks. The purely idealist 
notion cannot be translated into practice without smuggling histori­
cally and culturally particular norms and institutions into itself. These 
norms and institutions call out for justification and undermine the 
transcendental and universal identity of justice itself. The purely real­
ist notion, on the other hand, cannot cope with the fact that justice is 
itself a governing practice that has power over the very institutions of 
which it is a part. Nor can it make sense of practical ideals in general. 
Not surprisingly, these drawbacks become particularly obvious, 
and troublesome, in cases of transitional justice - for example, in 
cases where a particular regime· is trying to move from authoritarian­
ism to democracy, or in cases where efforts are being made to correct 
injustices within existing institutions. In these cases, justice cannot 
possibly be viewed as transcendental or universal, since it is, at least in 
its worldly guises, constantly in flux. Nor can it be viewed as a mere 
reflection of the status quo or of prevailing power relations, since it is 
frequently a powerful ideal in altering prevailing power relations and 
in democratizing institutions and practices that were in the past un­
democratic. 
In these cases, we would appear to be in need of a notion of justice 
that not only bridges the idealism/realism divide, but that treats justice 
in the following ways: first, as part of institutional life, rather than as 
an ideal imposed from above; second, as infused with the practicalities 
of institutional life, rather than as tainted by them; third, as manifested 
differently at various stages of history and within distinct social and 
political institutions; and fourth, as a powerful tool for bringing about 
social and political change. In other words, we would appear to be in 
need of a notion of justice that views justice realistically while pre­
serving its standing as a powerful ideal - a notion of justice we might 
call pragmatic. 
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How might we articulate such a notion of justice? How might we 
use it to explain and to argue normatively about justice in transitional 
regimes and in cases where we wish to move beyond the status quo 
within existing institutions? Ruti Teitel and Ian Shapiro provide us 
with intelligent, creative, and compelling answers to these questions, 
first by developing a notion of justice that is both realistic and norma­
tively powerful, and then by using this notion of justice within their 
own richly detailed studies. Teitel focuses on the nature and functions 
of transitional justice in various democratizing regimes of Eastern 
Europe, Africa, and Latin America. Shapiro develops a principle of 
democratic justice that is both grounded in various spheres of life, 
both public and private, and powerful in rendering these spheres of 
life more democratic than they are now. 
I. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN PRACTICE 
Teitel begins Transitional Justice by making clear that in cases of 
transitional justice, like in cases of "ordinary" justice, law does not de­
termine politics. Nor does politics determine law. Instead, the two 
shape each other within a dialectal relationship that is mutually con­
structive. Hence, we cannot view law in transitional contexts as a mere 
product of economic interests or political circumstances in the way 
that, say, critical legal theorists do. Nor can we, like idealists, view law 
as outside the boundaries of transitional politics. Instead, we have to 
view law as produced by, and powerful over, both transitional politics 
itself and the more particular norms ostensibly associated with it. How 
can we do so? What does transitional justice look like in such a dialec­
tical framework? 
According to Teitel, while transitional justice shares many of the 
characteristics of other legal systems, including its valuation of the rule 
of law and its emphasis on regularity, it takes on special transitional 
qualities by virtue of its role in structuring the normative and institu­
tional transformation of a political community from one regime to an­
other. Not surprisingly, many of these characteristics are analogous to 
the transitional process itself. In other words, they lead us to view jus­
tice in transitional contexts as in flux, partly determined by the flow of 
events, straddled between different sets of norms, and effective in 
bringing about social and political change. 
Teitel treats her conception of transitional justice as controversial 
and as a major contribution to the study of transitional regimes both 
past and present: 
The thesis of this book is that the conception of justice in periods of po­
litical change is extraordinary and constructivist: It is alternately consti­
tuted by, and constitutive of, the transition. The conception of justice 
that emerges is contextualized and partial: What is deemed just is contin­
gent and informed by prior injustice. [p. 6] 
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Since transitional justice is always situated between at least two le­
gal and political orders, it implies paradigm shifts in the conception of 
justice itself and, as such, is considerably less stable and cohesive than 
"ordinary" kinds of justice. According to Teitel, in "ordinary" social 
contexts, law provides order, stability, and continuity. But in extraor­
dinary periods of political upheaval, law provides all of these things 
and acts as an agent of transformation by, among other things, devel­
oping hyperpoliticized forms of adjudication and providing frame­
works for discovering and airing the ugly truths of the past. In other 
words, it manages to take on two functions that remain constantly in 
tension with each other. 
Teitel treats as a paradox the fact that justice during transitional 
periods functions both to provide stability, order, and continuity, on 
the one hand, and normative and institutional change on the other. 
"Transitions imply paradigm shifts in the conception of justice; thus, 
law's function is deeply and inherently paradoxical" (p. 6). Likewise, 
she claims that such paradigm shifts render transitional justice radi­
cally different from "ordinary" justice. " [I]n transition, the ordinary 
intuitions and predicates about law simply do not apply" (p. 6). Hence, 
she concludes that we need to develop a completely new framework 
for analyzing transitional justice or, in her terms, a "paradigm of trans­
formative law" (p. 6). 
Teitel, in the end, probably overstates her case in claiming the exis­
tence of a radical disjuncture between transitional justice and "ordi­
nary" justice, since "ordinary" justice shares many of the characteris­
tics that she describes here as "extraordinary." (She concedes later in 
her analysis that transitional justice has "affinities to law in nontransi­
tional circumstances" and that "one might think of transitional juris­
prudence as exaggerated instantiations that vivify conflicts and com­
promises otherwise latent in the law, and, in particular, illuminate 
law's relation to politics" (p. 228).) Moreover, she confuses matters 
somewhat when she talks about the tensions that are created by transi­
tional justice's dual functions of stability and change as a "paradox," 
since these tensions reflect, not a disjuncture between intentions and 
consequences, but rather the complicated nature of law itself. 
The model of transitional justice that she develops, however, is 
comprehensive, very useful, and grounded in a great deal of empirical 
evidence. According to the model, all instances of transitional justice 
share four general qualities. First, they situate themselves between at 
least two different regimes whose normative basis is strikingly differ­
ent - e.g., authoritarianism and democracy. Hence, they inevitably 
embrace a mixed bag of principles. Second; they are designed not only 
to create stability in transition, but also to move the community in 
question from one regime (whose norms are bad) to another regime 
(whose norms are good), and so to correct past injustices. As such, 
they are both associated with a set of positive goals - e.g., democracy 
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- and structured by the nature of the particular evils that they try to 
overcome. 
Third, unlike "ordinary" cases of justice, cases of transitional jus­
tice do not pretend to be apolitical or uncreative. Instead, they are de­
signed to realize a particular set of political goals and to lay the foun­
dations of political transformation by redistributing power and wealth, 
constructing new legal orders, and shaping new collective identities. 
Finally, in doing all of these things, cases of transitional justice often 
find it necessary to infuse legal judgments themselves with political 
considerations of a very worldly - and sometimes obviously partisan 
- sort. 
Since transitional societies differ greatly with respect to both cul­
ture and history, these four features of transitional justice take on very 
different forms within particular transitional contexts, as well as in 
particular spheres of legal justice: criminal, reparatory, administrative, 
constitutional and "historical." Likewise, they function very differently 
in particular communities and have significantly different conse­
quences - both positive and negative - across particular cases. How 
are they manifested in particular spheres of justice? What is their func­
tion in the transitional process? What consequences follow from them 
for the community in transition? 
In the context of criminal law, transitional justice takes the form, 
not only of punishment, but also of amnesty and clemency, in associa­
tion with past crimes and acts of regime violence. It also functions to 
keep order, to draw a line between regimes (in cases of punishment), 
to heal wounds in the community (in cases of amnesty and clemency), 
and (in all cases) to reinforce the norms and values of transition. 
Moreover, it does so with an eye to the political consequences of these 
measures in particular contexts. Hence, it is, as we might expe�t, less 
regularized than "ordinary" criminal justice. 
Since it is self-consciously practical, flexible. with respect to the 
standards and criteria that it employs within particular cases, and 
keenly aware of the political consequences of its judgments, criminal 
justice in transitional contexts is inevitably more effective and politi­
cally useful to those in power than criminal justice in many other con­
texts. But it is for these same reasons open to abuse. Indeed, as Teitel 
nicely demonstrates, its very flexibility and openness to politics threat­
ens to undermine the legitimacy of law itself and to raise the specter of 
criminal justice as a series of political show trials. How, if at all, can 
such abuse of criminal justice be prevented in .transitional contexts? 
In one of the most well thought out and fruitful sections of the 
book, Teitel argues that many of the worst abuses that we might ex­
pect of criminal justice in transitional contexts can be prevented by 
using international systems of justice, which, she claims, divorce ques­
tions of punishment from national politics. According to Teitel, inter­
national systems of justice provide stan.dardized grounds for account-
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ability and hence greatly reduce the possibility of political show trials, 
even though they might not, as Teitel suggests, eliminate the dilemmas 
of successor justice altogether.5 
Transitional justice is equally political and powerful, as well as 
open to political abuse, in cases of reparatory law. In these cases, tran­
sitional justice repairs the economic damage from earlier periods by 
redistributing wealth, instituting new rights, and restoring victims' dig­
nity through the legal recognition of the wrongs they suffered. Admit­
tedly, the state often pursues reparatory justice in these cases for the 
sake of economic development and political stability. But it also uses 
reparatory justice to reconstitute the political community it represents 
by giving individuals an economic stake in community membership. 
Since so many of the schemes of reparatory justice instituted dur­
ing transitional periods are intended to give citizens an economic stake 
in the community, they tend to create a new class of property holders, 
whose activities as property holders have very important consequences 
for transitional politics. In some cases, members of the new class con­
tribute in important ways to the development of liberal democratic in­
stitutions. In other cases, they tear the community apart, prevent a 
smooth transition to democracy, and reintroduce authoritarianism. In 
both kinds of cases, reparatory justice grows out of the need to check 
past abuses and plays an important role in the development of new 
political paradigms, even though these new paradigms of politics may 
not always be as liberal or as democratic as originally intended. 
Not all cases of reparatory justice, of course, involve individuals or 
members of classes as the focal point of attention. Indeed, some of the 
most interesting cases of reparatory justice involve the state as both 
the perpetrator of abuses and the provider of reparations. In many of 
these cases, the issue is whether a present state should assume the 
debts of its predecessor. Not surprisingly, such cases are often resolved 
on the basis of economic considerations. But they also involve consid­
erations about the state's identity through time and have important 
consequences for identity formation among both individuals and state 
actors. 
As Teitel cogently argues, a state's willingness to assume the debts 
of its predecessor is often a sign of intended continuity between re­
gimes and, if backed up with concrete acts of reparation, can lead to 
the development of an historically inclusive identity.6 Conversely, a 
state's unwillingness to pay reparations to the victims of its predeces­
sor regime, which occurred most obviously in post-Civil War America, 
5. "Within the internat ional l egal system," she writes, "the dilemmas of successor justice 
fal l away." P. 33. 
6. This was the c ase, Teitel argues, in post -World War II Germany, although even in this 
c ase the inc lusive identity c reated through reparations involved rejecting much of the older 
regime. 
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signals the desire of such a state not only to distance itself from the 
abuses of the previous regime, but also to exclude the previous regime 
from national identity - that is, to start anew with respect to national 
self-consciousness. 
What about administrative and constitutional law? Both kinds of 
law, as it turns out, take on very peculiar - or distinctly transitional -
characteristics during transitional periods because of their role in tran­
sitional politics, and because of the tension that develops between this 
role and the more conventional stabilizing functions of law. Adminis­
trative law is most strikingly different in transitional periods because 
of its participation in the purges that exclude former leaders and bu­
reaucrats from power. Transitional constitutional law differs most ob­
viously from its "ordinary" counterparts in that it is frequently, al­
though not always, designed as a set of interim measures, rather than 
as a permanent fixture of the regime. 
Since transitional justice in both administrative and constitutional 
law is by nature more flexible, activist, and political than administra­
tive and constitutional justice in "ordinary" contexts, it is potentially 
more effective in bringing about social and political change and in 
transforming the norms of the regime itself. But it is also potentially 
more damaging to the regime, especially in cases where the norms in 
question are those of liberal democracy. In these cases, the hyperpoli­
tical nature of law creates a "tension of illiberal means directed to lib­
eral forward-looking ends" (p. 163). As such, it threatens the process 
of liberalization itself, and possibly even the meaningfulness of democ­
racy as espoused by the transitional regime. 
Teitel admits that such a threat is serious, and that transitional jus­
tice is also found in places that appear to have lost sight of their origi­
nal liberal democratic goals. But she argues that neither the threat 
posed to liberalization by transitional administrative and criminal jus­
tice nor the fact that transitional justice appears to exist in regimes in 
the process of moving backward creates a fundamental problem for 
her analysis. She explains, in a passage that is bound to be controver­
sial, that transitional justice is often self-correcting and capable of 
checking its own power. "Post-war purges lasted only a short while," 
she writes, and "[t]ransitional constitutions . . .  transcend political ar­
rangements" (pp. 163, 210). 
In the end, Teitel does not include acts of backsliding in her model 
of transitional justice itself. But she does present other aspects of tran­
sitional justice in great detail and organizes them together into a co­
herent whole that should be very useful to all those concerned about 
both the legal institutions of transitional justice and transitional 
movements in the particular geographical areas that she covers. 
Moreover, she does so with a keen sense for the differences that exist 
across regimes and through time. Hence, she manages not only to pro­
vide us with a model of transitional justice that is valuable to legal 
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scholars and area specialists but to contribute in important ways to the 
comparative study of transitional law, both past and present. 
While Teitel's model of transitional justice goes very far in articu­
lating the institutional mechanisms of transitional law, it does not, as it 
turns out, tell us a great deal about the ideals of justice that guide the 
transitional process in particular cases. Nor does it explore the connec­
tions between these ideals and the institutional mechanisms of transi­
tional law that it does articulate. Instead, it takes these ideals, which 
are largely liberal and democratic, for granted and focuses on transi­
tional law as the subject matter of transitional justice. 
Presumably, if Teitel had focused attention on the liberal and 
democratic ideals of justice that she cites as manifest in the legal insti­
tutions of transitional justice, she would be forced to confront a set of 
very sticky questions that she does not now address, questions such as: 
What if the legal institutions of transitional justice in place fail to move 
us towards those goals of liberalism and democracy that we associate 
with justice? Can we still talk about these institutions as just? Do we in 
these cases have to distinguish between two different notions of transi­
tional justice: one normative, the other legal? If so, what is the norma­
tive notion of justice at work in cases of transitional justice? 
Since Teitel has taken on a largely explanatory, rather than con­
ceptual or normative, project, she is under no obligation to answer the 
last question (although the first three questions would still seem to be 
within her purview). How might a normative political theorist answer 
this question? Presumably, she or he would have to take a step back 
and ask: How might we bring justice and democracy (or liberalism) to­
gether into a democratic (or liberal) principle of justice? How might 
we ensure that such a principle is useful in bringing us closer to de­
mocracy (or liberalism) in transitional contexts? What might such a 
transitional principle of democratic (or liberal) justice look like?7 
DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 
In Democratic Justice, Ian Shapiro provides an excellent example 
of what such a principle might look like. Shapiro, like Teitel, begins 
with a plea for pragmatism in formulating principles of justice in gen­
eral, a plea that rejects transcendental ideals of justice and recognizes 
that justice is, at all levels of abstraction, part of particular social and 
political practices. But Shapiro, unlike Teitel, is a normative political 
theorist. Hence, he does not set out to explain what justice looks like 
in particular contexts, although he does manage to incorporate a great 
deal of empirical knowledge into his arguments. Instead, he sets out to 
5.  I do not think that it is important to treat liberalism and democracy as analyt ic ally 
separate here, s ince, while they might in the end be compat ible, they are c learly in tens ion at 
points . 
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develop a political - as distinct from a distributive - principle of jus­
tice that will enable us to move beyond the status quo and democratize 
existing social and political institutions. 
Shapiro calls his principle of democratic justice a "semicontextual 
ideal" to underscore that while it is both grounded in practice and 
manifested differently within particular institutions, it is not merely a 
reinforcement of present convention. Instead, it is a guiding principle 
that, though "forged out of reactive struggles" (p. 2) , is also powerful 
in furthering democratic purposes by virtue of its ability to criticize the 
relationships of hierarchy and domination that pervade various 
spheres of public and private life. His ideal, in other words, is histori­
cal in origin, meaningful only within particular contexts, never realized 
perfectly, and corrective by nature - i.e. "designed to remedy evils 
experienced in consequence of prior political institutions" (p. 2): 
[D]emocratic justice is a semicontextual ideal. It engenders certain con­
straints on and possibilities for human interaction, but these work them­
selves out differently in different domains of human activity, depending 
on peoples' beliefs and aspirations, the causal impact of activities in one 
domain for others, the availability of resources within domains, and a va­
riety of related contingent factors. [p. 5] 
Shapiro makes clear that his principle of democratic justice is de­
signed to straddle the extremes of realism and idealism and, in doing 
so, to incorporate the best of both theoretical frameworks. "Demo­
cratic justice as a semicontextual ideal mediates between the extremes 
of Rawlsian idealism and Maclntyre's attachment to social practices 
now in place and avoids the drawbacks of both theories" (p. 13). 
What is the substance of democratic justice? What is its status in 
social and political criticism? How does it help us to democratize ex­
isting social and political institutions? According to Shapiro, demo­
cratic justice is first and foremost a political, as distinct from an eco­
nomic or a moral, concept. As such, it does not focus primarily on 
distributions of wealth or on respect for moral rights, although it might 
well take these two things seriously in the process of achieving justice. 
Instead, it focuses largely on relationships of power - relationships 
that constitute politics broadly understood by Shapiro within the 
spheres of family, work, and politics. 
Democratic justice is for Shapiro a matter of applying two key val­
ues or aspirations of democracy to these power relationships as they 
are manifest in all spheres of life in an effort to ensure that our social 
and political institutions are as democratic as possible. The first of 
these two values or aspirations is equality, which is most usefully un­
derstood from Shapiro's perspective as equal participation in govern­
ance and the absence of hierarchy and domination. The second is that 
of opposition within governance. "[D]emocracy is as much about op­
position to the arbitrary exercise of power as it is about collective self­
government" (p. 30).  
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Both values are crucial to the realization of democracy in public 
and private life. But they do not exist as trumps for Shapiro in the way 
that they do for many other democratic theorists. Instead, they exist as 
"justice-promoting" ideals - i.e., ideals that help us to achieve other 
ends in life in a democratic way. Shapiro calls the more general notion 
of democracy that he associates with these ideals a "subordinate foun­
dational good," rather than either the foundational good or a primary 
good. And he makes clear that democracy, while very important to 
justice, is not an end in itself or a substitute for justice per se: 
[We need] an account of justice that accords a central place to demo­
cratic ways of doing things, and a conception of democracy that can be 
justice-promoting rather than justice-undermining. To this end, my con­
tention is that we should think of democracy as a subordinate founda­
tional good, designed to shape the power dimensions of collective activi­
ties without subverting their legitimate purposes. [p. 18] 
Democratic justice, then, governs the relationships of power that 
exist between individuals in particular spheres of life according to the 
principles of equality/non-domination and opposition. But it does not 
determine which activities are appropriate within these spheres of life. 
Nor does it have anything to say about what the legitimate purposes of 
these spheres should be. Instead, it takes for granted the activities and 
purposes that now exist within our various spheres of life - in much 
the same way as Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice8 does - and asks 
us to focus our attention on the relationships of power in which these 
activities and purposes are carried out and realized. 
Moreover, democratic justice insists on practical grounds that we 
begin with existing practices and institutions, rather than try to invent 
new ones. "The goal is to take social relations as we find them and dis­
cover ways to democratize them as we reproduce them. Democratic 
justice thus has a Burkean dimension, but this is tempered by the aspi­
ration to create a more democratic world over time" (p. 36). 
How do we apply the principle of democratic justice to existing in­
stitutions? First of all, we have to focus on particular spheres of life 
and discern both the particular activities and the particular purposes 
associated with them, as well as the nature of the relationships of 
power that exist in them and the institutions within which these rela­
tionships take place. Second, we have to ask: How far can we go in 
democratizing these relationships of power without undermining the 
purposes of the activities associated with them? How much opposition 
can we allow without destroying the spheres of life in question? 
Shapiro realizes that we can never do away with all hierarchical 
relationships; we can only aspire to do away with many of them. While 
all hierarchical relationships are suspect - "[t]he reason being that 
8. MICHAEL WALZ ER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). 
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they contain both power inequalities and truncated opportunities for 
opposition" (p. 42) - not all can be eliminated without the loss of ba­
sic goods. Indeed, some of these hierarchical relationships, such as the 
parent-child bond, appear to be necessary to the well-being of those 
who find themselves subordinated. 
While such a concession might appear to backtrack on democracy, 
it does not, for many of the hierarchical relationships that we now con­
strue as necessary are not at all necessary, and may even be detrimen­
tal to the realization of basic goods. "Too often avoidable hierarchies 
masquerade as unavoidable ones, involuntary subordination is 
shrouded in the language of agreement, unnecessary hierarchies are 
held to be essential to the pursuit of common goals, and fixed hierar­
chies are cloaked in myths about their fluidity" (p. 42). 
We need to ask in particular cases: Is hierarchical relationship X, 
Y, or Z necessary? Is it appropriately hierarchical? (Is it more hierar­
chical than it needs to be?) Might it be redesigned so that it becomes 
less hierarchical in the future? Is it a voluntary hierarchical relation­
ship, or is it imposed on individuals? Can individuals opt out of it, or is 
it permanent? Does it create the need for more or fewer hierarchical 
relationships of other kinds? Does it create the need for more or fewer 
hierarchical relationships of the same kind? 
All of these questions grow out of a sense - absolutely crucial to 
the principle of democratic justice - that while hierarchical relation­
ships are bad in general, some are less bad than others. Presumably, 
fluid and temporary hierarchies are more acceptable than ossified and 
permanent ones, since the domination within these relationships is less 
than it would be in its more rigid counterparts. Voluntary hierarchies 
are presumably more acceptable than imposed ones, since freedom is 
possible in the former, and since consent is a value in any case. Un­
necessary hierarchies are presumably always out. So, too, are hierar­
chical relationships that require the development of other kinds of hi­
erarchical relationships or that debilitate individuals to the extent that 
they cannot do without hierarchy altogether. 
As it turns out, one has to know a great deal about both the par­
ticular spheres of activity in question, as well as about the hierarchical 
relationships in them, to figure out how to apply Shapiro's principle of 
democratic justice in practice. Indeed, one has to have a firm grasp not 
only of how power is wielded in each sphere, but of how the institu­
tions of family, civil society, politics, and the market function sepa­
rately and together in particular regimes. In this sense, Shapiro's the­
ory of democratic justice imposes very stiff empirical knowledge 
requirements on those who want to employ it, requirements that 
Shapiro himself meets very nicely in his own application of the princi­
ple to particular cases. 
Shapiro's substantive arguments about democratic justice, where 
he applies his principle of democratic justice to practice, are extremely 
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rich in detail and complex in ways required by a theory that purports 
to bring about democracy from within existing institutions. Moreover, 
these arguments cover an expansive territory, including issues of 
democratic justice in childhood, marriage, work, retirement and life's 
end. Hence, I cannot in this space possibly treat them in any depth or 
detail. Nor can I cover them all. Instead, I can only mention a few of 
them to flesh out what it means according to Shapiro to democratize 
power relationships within particular institutional contexts. 
As we might expect, parent-child relationships pose some of the 
most difficult challenges to democratic justice, since hierarchies of 
some kind are probably always going to be necessary, especially in the 
case of young children. But according to Shapiro, we can do much bet­
ter than we now do in providing children with democratic beginnings. 
Parent-child hierarchies do not have to be prolonged forever, nor must 
they pervade all aspects of a child's life. Instead, they can be kept to a 
minimum and shaped according to the principle of democratic justice 
to the extent that the only ones allowed to stay in place are those that 
are 
pertinent to their legitimate purposes [of care] . . .  constrained to operate 
in the interests of the children on whom they are imposed . . .  designed to 
prepare children to leave them in a timely fashion, and, where possible 
. . . structured so as to reinforce - and certainly not to undermine -
democratic practices in the broader polity. [pp. 69-70] 
While Shapiro's democratic principle of justice cannot eliminate all 
of the hierarchical relationships of power in the lives of children, it can 
go far in eliminating such relationships in the institution of marriage. 
Here Shapiro focuses on patriarchal marriage and shows how virtually 
all of its hierarchical aspects, including its asymmetrical nature, its 
permanence, its insulation, and its nonvoluntary structure, are unnec­
essary to the basic goals of intimacy and freedom associated with mar­
riage and hence are in violation of the principle of democratic justice. 
[P]atriarchal marriage runs afoul of every presumption against hierarchy 
discussed above. It is evidently unnecessary, as demonstrated by the exis­
tence of [many] alternatives . . . .  Its hierarchy is asymmetrical: matriarchy 
is not only not available, but frowned on in patriarchal cultures . . . .  It 
can be said to be chosen only in the highly constrained sense that people 
can opt for it or not, often knowing that the latter choice will come at a 
considerable economic and social price. [pp. 116-17] 
How, though, can we institutionalize nonpatriarchal marriage? 
How can we set up and legally enforce marriage contracts that are as 
nonhierarchical as they can be given the values of both intimacy and 
freedom? Shapiro rejects Susan Okin's proposal for mandating the 
equal splitting of wages between husbands and wives9 on the grounds 
9. SUSAN OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 139-169 (1989). 
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that to do so interferes with the ability of individuals to design their 
relationships according to their own particular needs, personalities, 
and values. According to Shapiro, "[g]overnments do better . . .  to en­
able consenting adults to operate their own domestic arrangements in 
ways that do not undermine the possibility of effective opposition" (p. 
122). 
But Shapiro does not jettison a role for the state in marriage alto­
gether. Indeed, he insists on grounds of democratic justice that the 
state enforce no-fault divorce laws and outlaw designer marriages and 
prenuptial agreements that restrict the freedom of partners to exit the 
marriage and to share in its benefits. Likewise, he insists that women 
possess an absolute right to control their own reproductive functions; 
otherwise they would not be free from the domination of male part­
ners or the state, nor could they exercise their oppositional powers 
against other oppressive practices in society. 
Democratic justice in the workplace and marketplace is somewhat 
more complicated as an issue than democratic justice in other spheres 
of life, not only because the various. institutions associated with it are 
so complex and causally related in complicated ways, but because the 
question, "Is hierarchical relationship X, Y, or Z necessary to produc­
tion or to the maintenance of the workplace itself?" is normally an­
swered by participants in such relationships (managers and workers) 
in a highly interested and partisan fashion. But, Shapiro argues, we can 
nevertheless use the principle of democratic justice to render the insti­
tutions of work, as well as those of the market, much more democratic 
than they now are. How so? 
Here again the task is to figure out how far we can go in eliminat­
ing hierarchy and domination from, in this case, the workplace, with­
out undermining the basic good that it supplies - namely, material 
well-being for individuals and the community, as a whole. Among 
other things, Shapiro argues, we can provide freedom for workers 
from domination by managers by setting rules of termination on the 
basis of statute, as in Norway, Sweden, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom, or by developing a statute-bargaining hybrid such as that 
which now prevails in Germany. In other words, we can use the state 
to cut down on the power of managers in the realm of exit. 
Shapiro acknowledges that the proper balance between statute and 
bargaining in this context, as well as the particular rights that should 
be ascribed to workers, will always be relative to the particular em­
ployment patterns in place. But we can come up with a rule of thumb 
for moving ourselves toward democratic justice in this arena: 
The rule of thumb should be that the closer an actual society is to a 
surfer's paradise, the lighter should be the quantum of proof that em­
ployers must bear in employment litigation, but that the burden should 
grow as society approaches a Dickensian nightmare. Such a rule would 
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limit employers' freedom to take advantage of employees' necessity in 
setting terms and conditions of employment . . . .  [p. 184] 
Shapiro extends this rule of thumb in extremely interesting and 
useful ways into a whole host of employment and market mechanisms, 
and he thereby illuminates the wide range of relationships that must 
be balanced to keep hierarchy and domination to a minimum. Not 
surprisingly, he confronts a fairly large number of questions of dis­
tributive, as distinct from political, justice along the way, questions 
that remind us that political justice and distributive justice are always 
intertwined. While Shapiro acknowledges the interdependence of 
these two kinds of justice when talking about work and the market, he 
does not address the relationship between them directly. Instead, he 
concentrates on showing that, contrary to conventional wisdom, ques­
tions of distribution, such as those pertaining to one's access to goods 
and services, are also questions of political justice by virtue of their ef­
fects on one's relative power and vulnerability to the powers of others. 
In the end, Shapiro manages to demonstrate, by his own example 
as a normative political theorist who takes empirical social science se­
riously, what a contextualized or pragmatic principle of justice should 
be and what it should do for us. "A compelling conception of justice" 
in these and all other contexts "should be flexible and context­
sensitive . . . and remain faithful to their distinctive logics and pur­
poses . . . .  [It] must be sensitive to the contingencies of historical cir­
cumstance" (p. 25). 
Moreover, it should work within existing institutions in such a way 
that these are able to effect a transition to democracy without sacri­
ficing basic goods. "[D]emocratic justice is seldom about institutional 
design; usually it is about institutional redesign. We are born into on­
going complexes of institutions and practices. The task is to democra­
tize them as we reproduce them, not to design them anew" (p. 26). 
How compelling is Shapiro's own democratic conception of jus­
tice? What can we do with it? Who is obliged to accept it? Shapiro 
claims at the outset that his conception of democratic justice should be 
accepted by everyone, since democracy is now implicated in justice -
"valued by those who care about justice" (p. 19) - and since democ­
racy is, from Shapiro's perspective, necessary to the ordering of any 
sphere of life. "[D]issensus is an essential ingredient to the just order­
ing of any domain of human interaction" (p. 14). 
I suspect that Shapiro is right here that "democracy offers the most 
attractive political basis for ordering social relations justly" (p. 5) -
and that many of our realms of human interaction would be more pro­
ductive if they were organized democratically. But he can only claim 
that democracy is attractive to all as a basis of political justice if every­
one values democracy. And he can only claim that democracy is neces­
sary to the organization of all forms of human interaction if he can 
show this to be true in all spheres of life, including those, such as the 
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military, where many now find that dissensus hinders the realization of 
the basic goods supposedly promoted in these spheres. 
Neither of these points challenges the substance of Shapiro's 
democratic principle of justice itself. Nor does it suggest that a concep­
tion of justice that is democratic is not attractive. (Indeed, I suspect 
that democrats of all kinds will find Shapiro's principle of justice very 
attractive.) But it does suggest that its attractiveness presupposes the 
attractiveness of democracy itself as a set of ideals. Hence, those who 
do not find democratic ideals attractive, or who would prefer to 
ground justice in other political values, are not obliged to accept the 
privileged place that Shapiro gives to democracy in justice (unless, of 
course, Shapiro can show that dissensus really does enhance all 
spheres of human interaction). 
But once we state the project as articulating the best possible way 
to bring justice and democracy together, a project description that 
Shapiro himself employs in different parts of the book, his conception 
of democratic justice becomes very compelling, as well as very impor­
tant, for three basic reasons. First, it does something that other politi­
cal theories of justice should, but generally do not now do: it focuses 
attention on the justice of power relationships, as distinct from the jus­
tice of material distributions of wealth. In other words, it develops a 
distinctly political, rather than economic or moral, principle of justice, 
and it does so at a very high level of analysis. 
Second, it shows what this principle of justice looks like in detail 
within particular institutions, both public and private, on the basis of a 
great deal of detailed knowledge about these institutions (and with a 
healthy sense that private domination is also political). Hence, it is not, 
like many conceptions of justice, overly abstract or incapable of being 
manifest in particular institutions without losing its standing as justice. 
Instead, it allows us to talk about justice in many different spheres of 
life on the basis of the rules according to which these spheres are 
themselves governed and with an eye to the empirical conditions un­
der which justice itself will be manifest. 
Finally, like Teitel's model of transitional justice, it forces us to ac­
knowledge that justice as part of democracy is not a stagnant ideal or a 
set of standards that are to be imposed on democratic movements 
from above, but is instead a set of rule-based arrangements that evolve 
over time, that are never perfect, and that require constant reworking 
under new conditions. Not surprisingly, such arrangements are messy 
and in constant tension with other demands of democratization. But, 
as both Shapiro and Teitel show very elegantly, and with great success, 
any notion of justice that hopes to explain or argue normatively about 
justice in transitional periods of democratization must incorporate 
such contingencies into itself and be constantly open to their revision. 
